Shifts in economic geography and their causes: general discussion by R. Glenn Hubbard & Chair
Mr. Hubbard: Picking up on Doug Irwin’s remarks, Tony, the leap
from what we know from economic models to policy is rather
substantial. Please give your views on what we know about the rela-
tive strength of benefits of improvements in capital markets and
national champions or “big push” policies.
Mr. Srinivasan: Tony, you emphasized very much the divergence
aspect of globalization. It seems to me that any change, such as the
ones you emphasized for production and trade costs of technology, is
an enabling change. Whether or not that enabling change is utilized,
there is divergence across agents, countries, and the world in the ability
or in the willingness to take advantage of the opportunities opened up
by the change. So, divergence initially is to be expected; it is natural.
The question one has to ask is whether this is a transition phenome-
non. I grant you that transition could be for a long time. But whether
it is a transition phenomenon or whether it is a permanent congeal-
ment of the initial divergences and opportunities, I haven’t seen
anything that would suggest that whatever is happening is going to
make a congealment of the initial disadvantages and advantages. 
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49Mr. Feldstein: Doug correctly cautioned us not to take too seri-
ously the worries of those who think we are going to see U.S. wages
fall to Beijing levels. It is important to emphasize why the simple fact
of price equalization theory doesn’t hold. Most economists under-
stand this, but it is worth emphasizing. 
Why is it that U.S. workers making the same products that are made
in China earn higher wages? Well, they don’t because we don’t make
those same products. Low-skilled workers in the United States cannot
compete with low-wage, low-skilled workers in countries like China. 
What happens is that the products that are made by those workers
in China are imported to the United States, while the corresponding
low-skilled workers in the United States move into the service sector.
So, we can have higher wages for low-skilled workers in the United
States because there cannot be competition in the wide range of
service jobs, which now make up most of the U.S. employment. It is
worth understanding that, so the fear that somehow the production
in countries like China and India will drive down wages in the United
States doesn’t really concern us.
Mr. Garber: The last great convergence that we saw historically
ended in the divergence that was brought about by World War I. This
happened because there was a disproportionate increase. Although
there were gains from trade all across the board, there was a dispro-
portionate increase in the geopolitical power of some countries
relative to others in the context of a security system, which reflected
the old power relationships. And the whole transition was misman-
aged. Today, we see again a rapid increase in convergence in opening
and gains from trade and also a rapid shift in geopolitical power
within the context of the old system. Can we not expect the possibil-
ity that instead of just continuing onward progressively to see a
sudden breakdown that the old security system cannot handle this
shift in power?  
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 Mr. Goldstein: I wanted to ask Tony what the literature has to say
about what you might call diseconomies of proximity. If there is a
positive relationship between proximity and productivity, where does
that stop? If productivity goes up 40 percent when city size goes from
100,000 to 10 million, does it continue to go up when the city size
reaches 50 million?  
Where are traffic costs in the model? Imagine yourself in Jackson
Hole with all of its impressive physical surroundings, but imagine
there are 10 times as many people. So, there are lines to any activity
you want to do. Where does that appear? 
Ms. Krueger: I want to follow up a bit on Doug’s point about
neglected policy in terms of explaining or accounting for some degree
of income differentials. You emphasize proximity and economies of
scale and cited Asia relative to Africa to some extent. Everybody
knows those disparities. There are a couple of problems with the
comparison as an economic geography measure, however—one being
that the estimated per capita incomes in Africa as of, let’s say, 1960
were arguably somewhere between 10 and 20 times those of Korea
and China. So, indeed the economic geography changes are more
than simply a matter of Asia getting bigger. Ones that were bigger
have become, at least in per capita terms, and often absolutely,
smaller. But having said that, another part of the quarrel of using Asia
as an example would be that if you look at Taiwan, Korea, Hong
Kong, and Singapore in economic growth—and they are the first of
the miracle cases, I suppose—one of the interesting things is that in
none of those cases was trade with Japan, which was the one in the
region that was growing more rapidly and very large. In fact, in
Korea’s rapid growth period, it still hadn’t signed any kind of a truce
with Japan. That was simply not a factor. Now, I would certainly
agree that competition—as the Koreans watched what the Taiwanese
were doing right and vice versa—affected their policies and, therefore,
was important input. I would argue that anybody knowing, or
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 anybody living through, those transformations would put a great deal
of emphasis on the kinds of things that had to do with a more stable
structure, a better set of incentives, and being more market-friendly.
And what you have is certainly openness of the economy, getting infla-
tion under control, some degree of macro predictability, etc., and much
less to do with economies of scale in your sense of rising productivity
that the economic geography model, per se, would suggest. 
And just to finish off, we do have counterexamples. I have in mind,
for example, Chile’s fairly spectacular economic growth in Latin
America and everybody asking how they can do it and nobody else can.
Doug said in Australia and New Zealand and, in some sense, the prox-
imity in the kinds of ways you are using, it does not seem to account
for much of those successes or, for that matter, for some of the other
countries that have done poorly in regions that have done as a whole
very well. 
Mr. Venables: First, a plea: I am not trying to suggest here some sort
of monocausal theory of economic growth in the location of activity in
the world. I hope the paper is more careful in saying that more explic-
itly than perhaps I was in the talk. Of course, institutions matter. Of
course, policy matters. Of course, these other things matter. Setting up
geography against institutions as some sort of horse race—as people
have done—is a profoundly foolish thing to do. All these things matter.
I am not saying this as a cop-out or backing off. It is just as we build
up insights into the way the world works, we have to draw on different
theories and build up a fairly broad range of tools, ways of thinking
about problems. This is one element in the talk. I am really not saying
it is all that matters. I think the paper is careful about that. 
Second, please don’t read this as a plea for doing industrial policy. We
acknowledge that the world contains lots of market failures. It does not
follow logically from that, that the government can do any better. The
world does contain market failures. There are coordination problems,
and there are threshold effects. That has something to do with Africa’s
problem and the problem of oversized cities and things, but it doesn’t
mean that we have the policy tools, the wisdom, to leap from it straight
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 into industrial policy. Take these as a set of tools to gain more insight
on the world.
Next, I will address T.N. Srinivasan’s point: transition versus perma-
nent, the divergence convergence. The way I think about this coming
out of a particular model, a particular piece of work that we did, is that
the divergence, or clustering forces, are strongest at intermediate levels
of trade costs. When trade costs are high and we are all the same living
in our villages, if trade costs in everything went to zero, we could all
communicate perfectly by videoconference, by video link. If all the
advantages of proximity went away, then we would be a world of factor
price equalization, and everything would be uniform and nicely
smeared. So, in some sense, it is at intermediate levels where the
agglomeration stuff is going on, but you also can do trade. You don’t
have to be right next to your consumer. You can concentrate some
things and separate others. In some sense, it is at those intermediate
levels where the divergence forces are strongest. That is what the theory
suggests. Again, I hope the talk didn’t give the impression that I think
it is all divergence. No, it clearly is dispersing out. But the point is, it
can go either way. We had better understand that we need to think hard
about these forces. 
A final thing and then I’ll hand it over to Doug. I am leaving a few
questions unanswered. Yes, there are economies of scale up to a point,
and then you have the mega city that surely brings diseconomies. There
is some work by Vernon Henderson. I forget the exact number, but it
is 2.8 million or something for the optimal city size. (Don’t quote me
on that, but there is econometric work on that.)  
Let’s go back into policy, the normative stuff. We know cities grow
beyond their optimum size because of coordination failure in setting up
new cities. We want to set up secondary, tertiary cities in developing
countries, but we don’t know how. Building new capitals and things is
hopeless. We don’t how to do it, but we know that big cities have gone
beyond the maximum. How do we grow the second one? There is a real
set of issues there. 
I’ll leave the politics of the breakdown question and some of the other
questions for Doug.
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 Mr. Sperling: I wanted to point to something that perhaps combines
the chairman’s comments with this, but I think has been left off. Maybe
I would add that it’s a question of whether there is a new geography of
economic dislocation. The thing we don’t talk about as much here is
that when one looks at the dislocation that leads to much of the oppo-
sition, it is not the individual worker spread out. It is the fact that,
particularly in manufacturing, economic activity is highly concen-
trated. Therefore, when the industry loses its competitiveness, the
community, the area, spirals down uncontrollably. The question is, Is
this just part of the old economic geography of manufacturing? Or
when I look at what you are saying or one looks at Silicon Valley, will
one expect that even the promising future will see again significant
geographic concentration of activity, meaning that we have to spend
more time thinking about what is the economic geography of disloca-
tion? Will we still see shifts, not just the problem of individual workers
spread around, but the problems of a community suddenly losing its
demand all at once and spiraling down? 
Mr. Ortíz: I have just two observations. One has to ask the ques-
tion, given this economic geography discussion: Why is it, for
example, if Mexico is so close to the United States, that Mexico’s
incomes haven’t converged quicker to those of the United States?  
We did a little exercise at the Bank of Mexico in which we imagined
that we had not done the policy mistakes in the 1980s and 1990s; the
debt crisis of the 1980s did not exist because a series of policy mistakes
had not happened. It turns out that on conservative estimates, without
going into best policies—just the volume of mistakes—per capita
income in Mexico would be 66 percent higher than it is today. So, one
has to reflect—and this is following what Anne Krueger was saying a
little while ago—that the policy framework is probably as important
or even more important than what the economic geography theories
would predict.
I was discussing another point yesterday with Stan Fischer. We were
talking about this proximity and scales, saying that perhaps Mexico
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 City would be the most productive city in the world, maybe second
only to Mumbai or São Paulo. 
Mr. Frenkel: First of all, I enjoyed the paper very much. There was
some discussion on the changes in the size of countries as a result of
various changes in population as one of the determinants of what we
are going to see in the future. Let me add the dimension of age distri-
bution to the dimension of size distribution. Demographers tell us
that within the next, say, 15 years, we will see significant changes in
both size and age distribution in the world. Europe is going to shrink,
however, in a very peculiar way. The cohorts of the age above 50 in
Germany will expand. The cohorts in the age above 60 in Italy will
expand. Japan is going to shrink—significantly—but all the cohorts
above 70 will expand. At the very same time, you are going to have
fundamental changes in Asia. China will increase in the next 15 years
by 160 million people, as you indicated. But the age distribution is
going to be fantastically very different. In fact, everyone above 40 will
see more and more friends around him. Everyone below age 40 will
see fewer friends around him. That is the aging population in China.
At the same time, India will increase in the same period by 300
million people, but in a fantastically beautiful symmetrical distribu-
tion. Obviously, these changes in the age distribution must have
fundamental implications on the stability of the economic system,
the social system, the burden on the social security system, the
pension system, and also on the question of which population in age
distribution is more prone to initiate and absorb technical changes. 
Mr. Gurria: Thank you for putting this item on the agenda. We
at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) have been looking at some of these issues for some time.
We have done about 16 national studies on territorial develop-
ment, about nine studies on rural regions, about six or seven on
city regions, and about 14 on metropolitan regions. We have been
looking at the urban renaissance lately of some of the cities and
regions in the world. Basically, productivity and proximity come
out to be strong drivers. They are very positively correlated.
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 Subcontractors and customers work better when they are close.
Labor markets are more efficient when they are large. The spillover
of innovation from research centers is facilitated by face-to-face rela-
tions between technical people and researchers. It, of course, varies
from country to country, depending on the sectors and depending
on things such as property rights. 
Therefore, rather than looking like a paradox, it does explain and
confirm the findings about disparities and why per capita income is
not converging, but rather, in some cases, diverging. The regions
are, in fact, diverging in terms of how well they are doing. There are
some cases of hope in terms of countries that have actually clustered
or promoted certain regions, but there is, above all, the question of
overall macro policy of the countries themselves. In every case, what
the data suggests (and there is very good data) across all the
members of the OECD, at least for the subnational level, is that, of
course, enlightened policies can do a lot to improve economic activ-
ity and its outcomes in terms of wealth and welfare, even if you have
relatively badly endowed areas. It did a lot in the cases of Scotland
or Ireland, for example. Also, regarding how to adjust these imbal-
ances, you focused on solutions “within the countries” not only
across borders, but this is not achieved just by aiding the regions
directly through budget transfers. For example, even though Italy
has been putting billions and billions over decades into its southern
region, southern Italy still has four times the level of unemployment
as in the north. The solution is building and creating capacity in
these areas.
Mr. Venables: Gene Sperling’s point of increasing/decreasing concen-
tration in the future is going back again to T.N.’s thing. We just have
to do the research at the micro detail here. These effects operate in
different strengths in different sectors and spatial ranges. This approach
does have micro foundations, it does have empirical work, and we can
do the micro detail. 
There is an urban renaissance going on in developed countries. I
guess that is partly for consumption benefits, but it is partly
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 because an increasing proportion of what we do in the economy is
knowledge-based. A knowledge base really seems to thrive on face-
to-face communication, clustering. So, yes, if that is going to be
the structure the economy takes, then concentration will remain
important. It may possibly become more important in a lot of
developed, high-income countries in recent years because of this
knowledge-based urban renaissance thing going on. So, we have to
look at the micro detail.
Places are losing sectors and spiraling down. You have to analyze
that and really think what is mobile. How easy is it to move more
firms in? How easy is it to move workers out again? Let’s try to take
a tool kit of geographical ways of thinking about stuff to answer the
question when an area is hit. How easy is it to get it going again? It
is an approach. It is a tool kit. It is a way of doing things. 
Gordon Hanson and others thought about Mexico in geographi-
cal terms. Mexico is a nice geographical test bed for economic
geography because it obviously is a rather closed economy. It did
exactly what economic geography would predict. Everything clus-
tered in Mexico City, which had the highest productivity—not in
the world, but in Mexico. What has the recent economic story of
Mexico been? Again, it is rather a geographical one. It is the north-
ern border. You have some dispersion, some deconcentration from
Mexico City, development on the northern border, and increasing
spatial disparities north and south. So, again this whole tool kit, I
would argue, possibly fits the Mexican story rather well. It is a good
set of tools to apply to the Mexican story.
For the age questions, demographics are obviously interesting. I
don’t have any answers, but the obvious other thought that comes
to mind is migration. What is the migration angle on this going to
be in terms of bringing in workers to fill the gaps and the conse-
quent changes from that? 
It was interesting to hear how the OECD works. So, thank you
for that.
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